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ABSTRACT 
Somali piracy reached a record high level in 2008, with 111 of the 293 worldwide attacks 
occurring in the waters surrounding Somalia. The incidence of piracy in Somali waters 
almost doubled in 2009, and the Somali share of total piracy attacks worldwide increased 
from under 40% to over 50%.  Often overlooked is the initial upsurge in piracy, 
following the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, which contributed to a sharp 
increase in piracy in 2005 and again in 2008.  This thesis addresses why this initial surge 
occurred when it did.  This increase can be attributed to the transformation of the pirate 
business model from fishermen who started to defend themselves, to the organized crime 
that displaced them in 2004 due to the opportunistic behavior of warlords.  A 
convergence of factors contributing to the conditions at the time of the tsunami had short-
term effects in 2005 that were enough to provide a boost to the already increasing 
business model of piracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Somali piracy reached a record high level in 2008, with 111 of the 293 worldwide 
attacks occurring in the waters surrounding Somalia.1  The incidence of piracy in Somali 
waters almost doubled in 2009, and the Somali share of total piracy attacks increased 
from under 40% to over 50% (217 out of the 406).2   While observers generally trace 
Somali piracy to the persistent insecurity resulting from state collapse in 1991, piracy 
remained limited until the middle of the 2000s.  It then increased from around five attacks 
per year in 2004 to 25 in 2007, 111 in 2008, and 217 in 2009.3  Insecurity may be a 
necessary condition, but it clearly is not a sufficient explanation.  Piracy was also 
transformed in these years.  In the 1990s, pirates targeted mostly foreign fishing vessels 
close to shore.  In recent years, Somali pirates have reached hundreds of miles out to sea, 
operating from “mother ships” to attack large cargo ships.  American attention was 
captured as never before in April 2009, when the Captain of the Maersk Alabama was 
held hostage for several days before U.S. Navy SEALs enacted a rescue.  What accounts 
for the low level of piracy in the first 15 years of state collapse, and its rapid rise 
thereafter? 
While the European Union, the United States, and other partner nations attempt to 
control piracy by patrolling the seas off the coast of Somalia, the mission of effectively 
patrolling over one million square miles is virtually impossible to achieve.  Patrolling 
alone cannot be the answer.  The International Maritime Bureau, policy makers, navy 
commanders, and academics all recognize the importance of developing policies that will 
                                                 
1 All Africa News, Piracy Grows to Record Levels, January 2009, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200901160618.html (accessed August 17, 2009). 
2  International Maritime Bureau, 2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400, January 14, 2010, 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:2009-worldwide-piracy-
figures-surpass-400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (accessed March 12, 2010). 
3  Robert Middleton, Piracy In Somalia, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham 
House, 2008), 1–12.; James Krasaka and Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden, Working 
Paper (Rochester: SSRN Working Paper Series, 2009); G. H. and Tako, M. H. Musse, Illegal Fishing and 
Dumping Hazardous Wastes Threaten the Development of Somali Fisheries and the Marine Environment, 
September 9, 1999, www.geocities.com/gabobe/illegalfishing.html (accessed July 14, 2009). 
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effect change onshore.4  However, these policies generally are understood to require 
governance and capacity rebuilding, which today appears as unlikely as effectively 
patrolling one million square miles of ocean.  The 15-year gap between the collapse of 
the state and the rise of piracy suggests the possibility of other interim solutions.  
Understanding that gap should provide new insight into potential medium-term responses 
to piracy that move beyond patrolling, but do not require state reconstruction. 
Most of the research on the rise of piracy in the region falls into two camps, one 
arguing that it is a product of an enabling environment, and the other arguing that it is an 
act of self-defense by local fishermen and those who live in and around fishing 
communities.5  The first camp argues that statelessness created an “enabling 
environment” in which pirates can carry out attacks and hold ships while negotiating 
ransoms with little to no risk of repercussions.6  Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN 
Special Representative to Somalia, posits that piracy is driven by a group of opportunistic 
persons responding to the collapse of state authority and the poverty and insecurity it 
brought about.7  Patrick Lennox of the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute 
adds that, as young Somalis carry out successful piracy attacks and receive a portion of 
the ransom, they become more emboldened.8  Historian Walter Zapotoczny notes that 
“[e]ach successful hijack by the pirates brings more young men into the village to seek 
                                                 
4  “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships off the Coast of Somalia,” (resolution, International 
Maritime Bureau, 2009). 
5 Patrick Lennox, “Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute (Calgary, 2008). 
6 Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea (Taylor & Francis, Inc., 2006); Harvard Model Congress Europe 2009, 
“UNSC: Modern Maritime Piracy,” 2009, 
http://www.hmceurope.org/2009/docs/briefings/UNSC_maritime_piracy.pdf (accessed September 9, 2009); 
Michelle Nakamura, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa, (Newport: Naval War College, 2009); Charles Post, “A 
Growing Threat to Global Security,” The Drew Review (Drew University College of Liberal Arts) 2 (April 
2009): 72–85; Dennis Zogg, Why the US Navy Should Not be Fighting Piracy Off Somalia, (Newport: 
Naval War College, 2009), 1–27;  Stig Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, Report (Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009), 19–33. 
7 Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Service (CRS.gov, 2009), 
6–7. 
8 Patrick Lennox, “Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute (Calgary, 2008). 
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their fortune.”9  If the benefits of carrying out pirate attacks outweigh the probability of 
being caught and punished, the Somalis will continue to seek out piracy as a means of 
income.  Similarly, Zimombro concludes, “[w]ithout an effective government to … 
enforce law and order, criminality and nefarious activities have flourished.”10 
The second camp argues that piracy was initially a defensive response by local 
fishermen to increased illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste along the coastlines of 
Somalia—itself a side effect of the collapse of the state and, thus, its enforcement of 
fishing regulations that protected the coastlines from poachers.11  Pirates initially 
engaged in attacks against illegal fishing vessels, demanding compensation.  Warlords 
also established illegal fishing licenses that were sometimes printed on old Somali 
Democratic Republic letterhead, adding to the legitimate appearance of the licenses.12  
According to this camp, despite the weakness of the Somali state prior to 1991, fishing 
contracts were strictly enforced as a source of income for the government.13  Without a 
functioning Coast Guard after 1991, fishing contracts were no longer enforced, and 
European and Asian trawlers were able to take as much fish as they desired, leaving 
fewer fish for Somalia’s artisanal fishing sector.14  As the large majority of fishing in 
Somalia was artisanal, the fishermen did not stand much of a chance against large 
trawlers and other foreign fishing vessels.  Fishermen started to defend their territorial 
                                                 
9  Walter Zapotoczny, “Walter Zapotoczny,” Piracy, June 2009, 
http://www.wzaponline.com/Piracy.pdf (accessed March 02, 2010). 
10  Denise Ziombro, “Somali Piracy,” The Heinz Journal (Carnegie Mellon University) 6, no. 4 
(December 2009). Lauren Ploch and et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Service 
(CRS.gov, 2009), 6–7. 
11 Ahmed Nor, Executive Summary, 2007, http://fisheries.puntlandgovt.com/fisheries.php (accessed 
July 16, 2009); Theodore Richard, “Reconsidering the Letter of Marque,” Public Contract Law Journal 39, 
no. 3 (Spring 2010): 412–464; Katie Stuhldreher, “To Turn the Tide on Piracy in Somalia, bring Justice to 
the Fisheries,” Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 2008: 9; Robert Middleton, Piracy In Somalia, 1–
12; Donna Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa,” Africa Security Review 18, no. 3 (2009): 1–16. 
12  M.G. Hassan, “IUU Fishing and Insecurity Impacts on Somali Fisheries and Marine Resources,” in 
4th IUU Fishing Update & Consultation (London: Chatham House, 2008). 
13  Somali Democratic Republic, Fisheries Joint Venture Guidelines, Policy (Mogadishu: Somali 
Democratic Republic, 1985). 
14 Shashank Bengali, “An Interview With a Jailed Somali Pirate Leader,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, May 3, 2009: 6–7; Sabrina Grosse-Kettler, External Actors in Stateless Somalia, Policy Report 
(Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2004); Massip Ikken, “The Reasons Behind Piracy,” 
New African, July 2009: 34–35; James Kraska and Brian Wilson, “Maritime Piracy in East Africa,” Journal 
of International Affairs (ABI/INFORM Global) 62, no. 2 (2009): 55–70. 
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waters themselves, first by firing upon trawlers to chase them away, and then by taking 
fishing boats engaged in illegal fishing captive and their crews hostage, seeking 
compensation from the fishing companies.  The upsurge in piracy 15 years later is 
attributed to the displacement of local fishermen-pirates by organized crime.15   
Neither camp explains why the upsurge in piracy occurred when it did.16  The 
first camp notes, but fails to provide an explanation for, the timing of the upsurge.  Some 
researchers in this camp, such as Stig Hansen, consider the shift a campaign with 
intensive periods of attacks followed by quieter moments at sea.17  Some have pointed to 
changes in weather and financing as possible factors impacting the rise of piracy during 
certain periods of time, arguing that periods of calm weather and the injection of capital 
led to surges in piracy almost akin to there having been different campaigns.18  However, 
as this thesis will argue, these events—and those who argue their importance wrongly—
discount the significant and lasting impact on the levels of piracy that an event like a 
tsunami may have.19 Roger Middleton argues that profit-seeking militiamen and local 
warlords began working with the fishermen, providing better weapons and training to the 
fishermen who would carry out the attacks, but does not address why this occurred when 
it did. 20  Fishermen pirates and profit-seeking militiamen and warlords had been active 
for over a decade before the two phenomena merged.  Nor does either camp explain how 
the transformation occurred.  This thesis will begin to fill this gap.  It argues that a 
                                                 
15  Stig Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, Report (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and 
Regional Research, 2009), 19–33. Jon Shane and et al, “Criminological Theories and the Problems of 
Modern Piracy,” in Maritime Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Challenge of Piracy for the 21st 
Century, 1–11 (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 2009). Karl Sorenson, “State Failure on 
the High Seas,” Swedish Defense Research Agency (Stockholm, 2008), 18. 
16 James Kraska and Brian Wilson, “Maritime Piracy in East Africa,” Journal of International Affairs 
(ABI/INFORM Global) 62, no. 2 (2009): 55–70. Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea (London: Taylor & Francis, 
2006). 
17  Stig Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, 19–33. 
18  Ibid; Theodore Richard, “Reconsidering the Letter of Marque,” Public Contract Law Journal 39, 
no. 3 (Spring 2010): 412–464; Martin Murphy, “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,” Naval 
War College Review, Summer 2007: 23–26. 
19  Shashank Bengali, “An Interview With a Jailed Somali Pirate Leader,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, May 3, 2009: 6–7; United Nations, “Tsunami - Somalia,” Desk Report, Environmental Protection, 
United Nations (New York, 2005); Sara Percy and Anja Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia, 
Discussion Paper, DIW Berlin (Berlin: DIW, 2010), 13–26. 
20 Roger Middleton, Piracy In Somalia. 
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convergence of actors at the time of the December 26, 2004, tsunami facilitated the move 
of organized criminal organizations into piracy. 21   The analysis will show that the 
tsunami’s effects, intertwined with the changing business model, had a much greater 
impact on the transformation of piracy than is recognized. 
The research uses a process-tracing approach to isolate the effect of the 2004 
tsunami.  Chapter II will examine the state of the Somali fishing industry and the levels 
of piracy from the collapse of the Somali government through to December 2004, just 
before the tsunami struck.  The health of the industry, levels and the nature of piracy 
during this period will be explored.  Determining the conditions in this first time period 
will be important for comparison to the second time period.  Chapter III will look at the 
state of the fishing sector and levels of piracy in the five years after the tsunami.  Finally, 
Chapter IV draws conclusions and policy recommendations based on the findings.   
 
 
                                                 
21 Reuters, “UN Says 54,000 Somalis Stricken by Tsunami,” January 2005. 
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II. FROM STATE COLLAPSE TO 2004 
This chapter examines the evolution of the fishing industry and piracy during the 
1990s.  It shows that the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 adversely affected the living 
conditions of coastal fishing populations on the one hand, and created an enabling 
environment for warlords on the other hand, setting off two separate chains of events that 
would eventually lead both warlords and fishermen into piracy.  The chapter shows the 
slow transformation of fishermen into coast guards and later pirates, and the delayed but 
ultimately more aggressive and transformative move of warlords into piracy, affecting the 
financing, methodology, and ultimately the incidence of attacks in the region.   
Fishing, which never comprised more than 2% of GDP or employment, has 
always been the primary source of food and income for coastal populations. Although 
nomadic Somalis, the vast majority of the population, do not consume fish, there was a 
small industrial fishing sector in the 1980s, devoted to exports to Europe and other East 
African countries.22  However, tax rates of 35–40% made commercial fishing barely 
profitable, which kept the industrial sector small and allowed local artisanal fishermen to 
continue to operate alongside an average of 10 to 15 large foreign trawlers each season.23 
After the state collapsed, the tax rate fell to zero and foreign fishing trawlers poured into 
Somali waters.  While it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of vessels engaged in 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, groups such as the Somali Fisheries 
Society and the NGO Ocean Training Program collected data on approximately 200 
vessels conducting IUU fishing each season between 1991 and 1999.24  These ships used 
“prohibited fishing methods like drift nets, dynamites, breaking coral reefs and 
                                                 
22  FAO, FAO Fishery Country Profile, Profile, Food and Agriculture Organization (New York: 
United Nations, 2005); Mohamed Yassin, Somali Fisheries Management and Development, Thesis, Marine 
Resources Management, Oregon State University (Oregon State University, 1981), 41–42; Somali 
Democratic Republic, 7.  
23  Tbjorn Johnson, Commercial Trawling For Fish and Deep Sea Lobster Off Somalia, Institute of 
Marine Research (Bergen: UNDP FAO Program, 1985), 7.3; Somali Democratic Republic, Fisheries Joint 
Venture Guidelines, Policy (Mogadishu: Somali Democratic Republic, 1985); N.P Van Zalinge, “Summary 
of Fisheries and Resources Information for Somalia,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on the Assessment of 
the Fishery Resources in the Southwest Indian Ocean, 3.1 (Rome: FAO, 1988). 
24  G.H. Musse, Illegal Fishing and Dumping, 3. 
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destroying the coral habitats where lobsters and other coral fish live.”25  Puntland and UN 
representatives in Somalia immediately decried the prevalence of illegal fishing.26  
Leaders from the Somali political factions, along with the Somali Fisheries Society and 
the Centre for Research and Dialogue, wrote the Italian Foreign Minister, UN Secretary 
General Boutrous Ghali and the EU, detailing illegal fishing activity in Somali waters.27   
All to no avail. 
Local fishermen saw their catch decline by about 20% between 1992 and 2000, 
from 25,500 tons to 20,600 tons.28  Foreign companies reported catches in Somali waters 
of 12,200 tons in 1992 and 15,700 tons in 2000.29  This indication of a declining local 
industry and slightly increasing foreign catch is misleading, however, given the 
underreporting by foreign trawlers fishing illegally. The Marine Resources Assessment 
Group estimates that on average 90,000 tons of fish are caught in Somali waters each 
year by IUU vessels.30  In 2001, a local fisherman reported that at night the lights of the 
ships off the coast were so numerous that they could be mistaken for the lights of a city.31  
IUU fishing vessels were pushing artisanal fishermen out of the market.  Data on the 
                                                 
25  Ibid. 
26  Mohamed Abshir Waldo, “The Two Piracies in Somalia,” Wardheer News, January 8, 2009. 
27  Ibid; Mahamudu Bawumia and U. Sumaila, Fisheries, Ecosystems and Piracy, Working Paper, 
Fisheries Centre, The University of British Columbia (Vancouver: Fisheries Centre, 2010), 21. 
28  University of British Columbia, The Sea Around Us, 2007, 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/706/14.aspx (accessed June 29, 2010); FAO, FAO Fishery Country 
Profile, Profile, Food and Agriculture Organization (New York: United Nations, 2005). 
29  University of British Columbia, The Sea Around Us. 
30  Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries, (London: MRAG, 2005), 113. 
31  Abdirahman Kulmiye, “Militias or Trawlers: Who is the Villain?,” The East African, July 9, 2001. 
Similarly, according to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and the Marine Resources Assessment Group, 
between 1990 and 2002 10 to12% of the tuna caught in the Indian Ocean was caught in Somali waters 
(Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing on Developing Countries, Final Report (London: MRAG, 2005), 166–167; Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission, “The Role of Tuna Fisheries in the Indian Ocean,” Indian Ocean Tuna News, March 2001: 1–
3).  But this number is likely an underestimate.  The non-governmental Marine Resource Management 
Project Somalia found that 75 days of fishing produced 420 tons of fish per vessel, worth approximately 
$6.3M (Alec et al. Craford, Growing Unrest, International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(Winnipeg: IISD, 2008), 27).  Using the lower estimate of IUU vessels, as reported by the Ocean Training 
Program and Somali Fisheries Society, the catches of tuna reported to the IOTC would be accurate.  Using 
the higher estimates of the number of IUU vessels found in Somali waters each season, the numbers 
reported to the IOTC would be greatly under representative of the actual amounts of tuna being caught in 
Somali EEZ waters.   
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types of gear used to catch the fish corroborates the displacement of Somali artisanal 
fishermen by foreign fishing fleets.  The Somali fishing fleet is comprised of fiberglass 
skiffs and traditional sailboats or canoes, which are incapable of trawling or large-scale 
long lining, so the breakdown between commercial and artisanal fishing is also a 
breakdown between foreign and local fishing (Table 1).32  Foreign IUU/commercial 
fishing increased by 30% between 1990 and 1994, while local/artisanal fishing increased 
by 7%.33 The fish caught by IUU commercial methods represents the potential lost catch 
for artisanal fishermen, considering that IUU vessels operated in the waters regularly 
fished by artisanal fishermen.  Along with lost revenue from reduced catches, there were 
environmental impacts from IUU vessels’ overexploitation of resources and the 
destruction of coral reefs.34  In early 2004, Somali fisherman Daouda Wade summed up 
frustration with the foreign trawlers: “Those big boats have caught everything.  And now 
there’s nothing left for us, the Africans.”35 
Table 1.   Landings by gear type in waters of Somalia (tons)36  
 1990 1992 1994 
Commercial 24,878 27,993 33,016 
Artisanal 8,902 9,743 9,546 
According to Omar Abdulle Hayle, a Mogadishu-based fishery expert, 
immediately after the collapse of the state “trawlers began to come closer to the coast—
                                                 
32  G.H. Musse, “Current Status of Marine Fisheries in Somalia,” in Assessment & Monitoring of 
Marine Systems, 255–265 (Kuala Terengganu: University Putra Malaysia Terengganu, 1999). FAO, FAO 
Fishery Country Profile, Profile, Food and Agriculture Organization (New York: United Nations, 2005). 
33 While this represents a potential for local fishermen being prohibited from successfully growing in 
their annual catch, it is difficult to know without more data whether 7% growth over four years was less 
than usual for them.  Data availability for time beyond 1994 is too limited to make the same assessment. 
34  Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries, Synthesis (London: MRAG, 2005), 4–5; G. H. and Tako, 
M. H. Musse, Illegal Fishing and Dumping Hazardous Wastes Threaten the Development of Somali 
Fisheries and the Marine Environment, September 9, 1999, www.geocities.com/gabobe/illegalfishing.html 
(accessed July 14, 2009). 
35  Edward Harris, “Fishermen No Match for EU Trawlers,” Los Angeles Times, January 11, 2004: A3. 
36 Data derived from the Sea Around Us project 
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looking for lucrative fish species—triggering direct confrontation between the foreign 
vessels and Somali inshore fishermen.”37  Ad hoc groups of Somali fishermen and 
juveniles, including those who considered themselves local fisheries enforcers, attacked 
the trawlers and demanded compensation for illegal catches, but usually settled for taking 
anything of value from the trawlers.38  Many of the attacks originated from fishing 
regions, where the affects of IUU fishing would be greatly felt.39  Pirates of this period 
are accurately described as armed sea robbers because they were crewmembers of private 
vessels that committed armed robberies of vessels in Somali territorial waters.40  They 
roamed the coast in loosely formed groups, with little equipment, stealing whatever 
money or supplies they could, but rarely holding the crew hostage or taking vessels 
captive for ransom.  Most attacks took place in northeastern and central Somalia (Figure 
1).  In response, foreign fishing companies began arming their vessels in 1993.  Local 
fishermen also reported trawlers pouring boiling water on them, cutting their fishing nets, 
and destroying their small boats.41  In response to the illegal fishing and attacks against 
artisanal fishermen, they began more organized armed patrols near fishing towns in 
search of foreign vessels engaged in IUU fishing.42   
                                                 
37  Abdulkadir Khalif, How Illegal Fishing Feeds Somali Piracy, November 15, 2005, 
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/200/08.shtml (accessed July 18, 2010). 
38  Sabrina Keller, External Actors in Stateless Somalia, Bonn International Center for Conversion 
(Bonn: BICC, 2004), 22–23; Shashank Bengali, “An Interview With a Jailed Somali Pirate Leader,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 2009: 6–7; Abdulkadir Khalif, How Illegal Fishing Feeds Somali 
Piracy, November 15, 2005, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/200/08.shtml (accessed July 18, 2010). 
39  Robert Middleton, Piracy In Somalia, 5. 
40  Chairman Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) Concerning 
Somalia, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1766 
(2007),” S/274, Security Council, United Nations (New York, 2007), 18. 
41  Mohamed Abshir Waldo, “Somali Piracy: the Other Side of the Coin,” African Prospects, October 
2009: 8–11; Gary Weir, “Fish, Family, and Profit,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2009: 19-21. 
42  Abdulkadir Khalif, How Illegal Fishing Feeds Somali Piracy, November 15, 2005, 
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/200/08.shtml (accessed July 18, 2010); National Imagery and Mapping 
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Figure 1.   Location of attack, by region, 1991–1995.43 
In search of protection from this escalating violence, in 1993, foreign companies 
began negotiating fishing “licenses” with local warlords and clan leaders.44  It is unclear 
which party initiated the licensing scheme.  Owners and operators arranged licenses with 
warlords prior to entering Somali waters or after docking at a local port.45 Warlords 
provided armed sentries to guard the IUU fishing vessels, which in essence protected the 
warlord’s license ventures from attack by disgruntled fishermen.46  These licenses were 
often typed on letterhead of the previous government or bore the seal of the warlord, and 
were accepted as valid by local businesses, clans, and other warlords.47  Warlords then 
used the “licensing fees” to fund their militias in order to maintain their authority on 
                                                 
43 Adapted from FAS data (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pirates.htm) and Stig Hansen, Piracy in 
the Greater Gulf of Aden, Report (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2009), 22. 
44  UN (2003a), Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1425 (2002), (New York: United Nations, 2003), 44; M.G. Hassan, “IUU Fishing and Insecurity Impacts 
on Somali Fisheries and Marine Resources,” in 4th IUU Fishing Update & Consultation (London: Chatham 
House, 2008). 
45  Chairman Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning 
Somalia, 24. 
46 M.G. Hassan, “IUU Fishing and Insecurity Impacts on Somali Fisheries and Marine Resources.” 
47 Ibid. 
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land.48  This was a natural extension of preexisting warlord taxation of the banana trade, 
in which multinational corporations, including Dole and the Italian firm De Nadai, paid 
warlords for protection. 49  In addition to collecting taxes from shipping and airports, 
General Aideed reportedly earned a monthly income of $150,000 from taxing banana 
exports, just under the $175,000/month cost of funding his militia.50      
However, warlords were unable to deliver on the promised protection.  Indeed, 
starting in 1994, Somali fishermen shifted from robbery at sea directed at any vessel to 
boarding vessels suspected of illegal fishing, becoming more violent and aggressive in 
the process.51  They shifted their focus from robbing non-fishing vessels in the early 
1990s to attacking fishing vessels predominantly in the mid-1990s.  AK-47s were used 
routinely and occasionally rocket-propelled grenades—both readily available in Somalia.  
According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), three of the six attacks 
recorded in 1994 were on fishing vessels and three were against merchant vessels, 
compared with the attacks in 1993, during which no fishing vessels were reported as 
being attacked.52  Two Italian owned Somali Fishing Company (SHIFCO) vessels were 
captured in 1994, and two merchant vessels were captured and then used to pursue other 
fishing vessels, albeit unsuccessfully.  This showed that even non-fishing vessels, if 
boarded, were used to attack fishing vessels.  The two SHIFCO trawlers were held for 
ransom and released after the company paid $1M, and the merchant vessels released 
(without any ransom being demanded) after pirate efforts to use them to capture fishing 
                                                 
48  Alec Craford, Growing Unrest, International Institute for Sustainable Development (Winnipeg: 
IISD, 2008), 25. 
49  Abdi Samatar, “Somalia’s Post-Conflict Economy,” Bildhaan 7 (2007): 146–151; Sabrina Keller, 
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50  Alec et al. Craford, Growing Unrest, International Institute for Sustainable Development 
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51  Stig Hansen, Pirates in the Greater Gulf of Aden, 20–21. 
52  National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 1995 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ASAM-1994.htm (accessed August 3, 2010). 
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vessels failed.  Two fishing vessels were reported captured in 1997 and three in 1998.53   
However, many attacks were not reported, because the targeted ships were engaged in 
illegal activities and/or desired to pay a low ransom quickly and move on.54  ‘Fishermen-
pirates” took these vessels back to Somali ports, where they held the crews for what they 
claimed was lost fishing revenue.55 
More organized groups such as the “Somali Marines” in Harardhere, the Marka 
Group in central Somalia, and the Kismayo Volunteer Coast Guards in Southern Somalia, 
composed mainly of former fishermen, also began appearing in late 1994.56  An 
extension of the organized violence on land, which by this time had subsided below the 
1992–1993 levels, these groups came into existence along with the exit of UN forces.  
This increased organization facilitated holding ships for ransom over extended periods of 
time, and thus the shift from robbery to ransom.  Merchant vessels had been attacked and 
robbed by the pirate groups from the early 1990s, but the Kenyan merchant vessel Clove, 
captured by the “Somali Coast Guard” in February 1996, was the first merchant vessel to 
be held for ransom.57  This was the first unequivocal act of piracy, as defined by the UN, 
because the attackers were crewmembers of private vessels that committed attacks 
against vessels on the high seas—beyond the 12-mile territorial boundary of Somalia—
                                                 
53  National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 1998 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ASAM-1998.htm (accessed August 3, 2010); Shashank Bengali, 
“An interview with a jailed Somali pirate leader,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 2009: 6–7; Scott 
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http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~ar120/somalia.html (accessed March 17, 2010); National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency, 1999 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ASAM-1999.htm (accessed August 3, 2010). 
54 As an example of the disparity, an interview with pirate leader Farah Ismail Eid discusses the 1997 
attack and capture of a Chinese fishing vessel, while IMO and FAS reports show no reports of a captured 
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World Order, Draft, Royal Irish Academy, National University of Ireland, Galway (Galway: Centr for 
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 14
for private profit.  The attacks following the capture of the Clove typically involved 
detention of the crew and vessel for ransom.  In the years following 1996, this piracy and 
maritime extortion, in the form of ransoms, became even more organized and 
profitable.58  Ransom money was used to purchase new boats that could reach further out 
to sea, and more automatic weapons.59  Vessels were hijacked and held for ransom 
regardless of whether they were fishing illegally—or even fishing vessels (Figure 2).  
Though merchant vessels had been attacked before, only fishing vessels had been held for 
any sort of payment.  The proportion of fishing vessels versus merchant vessels captured 
during this time period started to shift.  As the number of fishing vessels captured 
remained the same, the amount of merchant vessels captured went up.  Attacks also 
occurred further from shore starting at this time, because the more lucrative merchant 
vessels were farther out at sea. 
 
Figure 2.   Merchant vessels hijacked and held for ransom.60 
The pirates hunted for bigger ships to get larger ransoms, but had fewer successes 
capturing bigger ships because of the increased difficulty due to the higher freeboard of 
the larger vessels and their greater maneuverability.61  When the vessels were captured, 
                                                 
58 M.G. Hassan, “IUU Fishing and Insecurity Impacts on Somali Fisheries and Marine Resources;” 
Shashank Bengali, “An Interview with a Jailed Somali Pirate Leader:”  6–7. 
59  UN (2003a), Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1425 (2002), (New York: United Nations, 2003), 44. 
60 Data derived from FAS and IMB reports. 
61 FAS data on attacks denote that during attacks on merchant vessels, the vessels were able to 
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 15
however, there were larger payoffs.62 The increase in payment of larger ransoms, 
beginning in 1998, showed that piracy could be a profitable enterprise, encouraging more 
hijacking of vessels for ransom.  The conditions for organized crime to move into piracy 
were falling into place.  Targets were plentiful, a few large ransoms began to be taken for 
merchant vessels, and the warlords took notice.63   
Warlords’ fishing licensing income dwindled as piracy took off.  Foreign fishing 
companies stopped purchasing licenses, which provided little actual protection from 
attack.  African Fisheries Management (AFMET), which funded warlords Hussein Ali 
Ahmed, General Aideed and Ali Mahdi, saw its revenue decline from $600,000 per year 
in 1996–1998 to about $300,000 in 2002.64  Puntland’s 1999 regional government 
licensing scheme ended as a result of conflict in Puntland in 2001–2002.65  Warlord fees 
for protection in the banana trade also dried up, as Dole and De Nadai left Somalia in 
1996 due to the warlords’ inability to deliver protection.66   
Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” was the first warlord to move into piracy.67  
A former civil servant, Afweyne accumulated large sums of money from importing 
weapons from Eritrea for warlord General Hussein Aideed in the 1990s.68  In 2003, he 
co-opted the Somali Marines of Harardhere, improving their organization.  He arranged 
financing from Somali businessmen and hired more experienced pirates from Puntland to 
                                                 
62  Ken Menkhaus, “Dangerous Waters,” Survival 51, no. 1 (Feb-Mar 2009): 21–25; Jon Shane and et 
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1425, 44. 
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join the organization and train new recruits.69  He acquired larger engines, which allowed 
attacks to be carried out several hundred miles from the shore with larger crews.  
Afweyne realized attacking slow, less well-armed cargo ships would increase the success 
rate of pirate attacks, and the profitability of the enterprise.70  The take-over of pirate 
groups by Afweyne and other warlords that followed introduced sophisticated high seas 
piracy against merchant vessels to Somalia.71  The Somali Marines continued to claim to 
be defending Harardhere fishermen, but as their piracy operations moved further out onto 
the high seas the only ties to fishing that remained were some of the boats they used to 
carry out their attacks.72  The pirates themselves were now ex-fishermen who were no 
longer protecting fishing grounds.  “Mother” ships were used to tow even small boats 
farther out to sea to attack larger vessels for higher profits.73  Skiffs once used for fishing 
were now fitted with larger outboard engines and used to capture ships on the high seas.  
Fishing nets were still carried in the boats, so that pirates could claim to be fishermen if 
caught, and former fishermen remained part of the crew because of their seafaring 
knowledge.74  However, the new warlord-led Somali Marines continued to distribute a 
portion of stolen cargo and ransoms throughout the town, creating bonds of economic 
dependency with the fishermen it had now fully displaced. 
The Afweyne model was emulated by Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, a warlord, 
businessman, and Governor of Lower Shabelle beginning in 2005 after the success 
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Afweyne found in the enabling environment following tsunami, who transformed the 
Marka Group, and warlord Mohamed Garaad, who began pirating ships in 2002, rose 
through the ranks of a pirate gang, and in 2005 as its leader adopted tactics similar to 
Afweyne’s in the southern port city of Kismayo.75  Thus, piracy was transformed by 
warlord entrepreneurship, in its organization, targets, tactics, and potential profitability 
beginning in 2003.  Nevertheless, the incidence of piracy remained relatively low, with 
two attacks in 2003 and three in 2004, all successful attempts.76  Potential profitability 
was finally realized only in the wake of the December 26, 2004 tsunami, which wreaked 
havoc along the Somali coast.  Fishing communities and fishing boats were destroyed and 
targets of opportunity close to the coast increased as ships carrying tsunami relief 
supplies arrived, drawing a substantial number of people out of fishing and into piracy.   
Pirate attacks jumped to 35 in 2005.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, the previous 
transformation of the piracy enterprise and the economic fallout of the tsunami combined 
to produce the dramatic growth in piracy that captured the world’s attention after 2004. 
                                                 
75  International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali Coast, 
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III. FROM TSUNAMI TO 2009 
The tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, led to more than 
death and destruction along the Somali coast, as it rolled over beaches and fishing 
villages in the volatile Mudug region.  The devastation caused the virtual collapse of the 
already weakened Somali fishing sector.  Nearly 75% of all fishing gear was lost or 
destroyed, and hundreds of fishing vessels were destroyed or severely damaged.77  At 
least 2,000 fishermen lost their livelihoods, and several fishing communities lost what 
few warehouses and cooling facilities had survived the war.78  The tsunami added to the 
misery Somali fishermen were already experiencing due to IUU overexploitation of their 
fishing grounds, and a lack of appropriate equipment for developing their trade.  This 
additional burden pushed an already fragile industry to the brink of collapse. This 
development converged with the increased organization, stronger networks, new targets, 
and increased profitability of pirate groups associated with warlord innovations, and a 
spike in targets of opportunity as tsunami relief supplies flowed into the region, to 
produce an unprecedented upsurge in piracy.  This chapter attempts to separate the 
independent effects of the tsunami and the continuing evolution of the business model on 
the growth of piracy after 2004. 
A. TSUNAMI 
NGO and UN relief assessments discovered that IUU fishing had done great 
damage before the tsunami struck, making recovery from the tsunami much more 
difficult.  Over a decade of IUU fishing had caused reduced yields, which led to the 
collapse of fishing co-operatives because of the reduced production.79  As fishermen gave 
up on the fishing in the face of IUU competition and/or tried their hands at piracy, 
                                                 
77  Gonzalo Tello, Fisheries Tsunami Emergency Program, EOM Report, Food and Agriculture 
Organization, United Nations (Nairobi: FAO, 2005), 10. 
78  Daahir Burale, FAO Post Tsunami Assessment Mission to Central and South Coast of Somalia, 
Field Report, United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (UN, 2005), 2–4. 
79  Ibid. 
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professional knowledge fishery management had been reduced.80 The large towns of Las 
Korey, Bosaso, Berbera, and the capital city of Mogadishu had cold storage and 
processing facilities that had been damaged during the war, but which had returned to 
some level of production as of 2003.81 In smaller towns along the coast, however, only 
two cold storage facilities existed.82  A severe shortage of functioning cold storage 
facilities meant that the fishermen who lived in outlying areas were dependent upon 
refrigerated trucks in order to bring their products to markets in the large cities or abroad 
to the Middle East.83  Ice was delivered to remote villages for short-term storage of 
products sold locally.84  The delivery of ice and transport of fish products was hindered 
by a road system that had suffered years of neglect in the absence of a state.   
The tsunami damaged both of the remaining coastal cold storage facilities in the 
smaller towns on the coast.85  Roadways to several villages in the Mudug and Nugaal 
regions in central Somalia were damaged or wiped out completely from the tsunami 
waves, limiting access to markets and cold storage in the larger towns, cold storage via 
refrigerated truck, and delivery of ice for short-term local storage.86  As result, over 50% 
of fish (excluding lobster) caught in 2005 was wasted due to spoilage.87  In addition, the 
tsunami destroyed nearly 25,000 nets and 3,700 traps—approximately three-quarters of 
all the fishing gear.88  Fishermen also lost 480 boats, with a further 466 severely 
damaged: accounting for two-thirds of all fishing boats.89  No reliable data is available 
for Somali fishery production after 2002, but FAO statistics show exports of fish and 
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lobster products dropped 25%, from 6,000 tons in 2004 to 4,500 tons, in 2005.90  Catch 
rates per vessel dropped from 17 tons/day in 2004 to 7 tons/day for yellowfin tuna in 
2005, due to the devastation of the fishery and fishing grounds as a result from the 
tsunami.91 As a result, in 2006, tuna fishing vessels moved further off the Somali coast in 
search of more lucrative fishing grounds, because of the lack of tuna found in the 
normally lucrative fishing grounds.92    
The UN put together a program to train fishermen and provide equipment and 
technical expertise aimed at rebuilding fishing communities.93  Starting in April of 2005, 
the training and equipment was focused in areas where 50–70% of the fishing capacity 
had been damaged or destroyed.  Funds from donor nations and agencies were used to 
purchase new fishing boats, nets, traps, and other gear.  Improperly sized lobster nets and 
traps (which captured immature lobsters) that had been lost were replaced with properly 
sized ones.94  Training, equipment, and rehabilitated processing facilities contributed to 
the partial recovery of fisheries, which increased exports from 4,500 tons in 2005 to 
5,200 tons in 2006.95  
Still, the loss of two-thirds of the fishing fleet and three-quarters of fishing gear 
put most fishermen out of business, at least temporarily.  Many found their way into 
piracy, already a growth industry.  Fishermen had always led pirate attacks using their 
knowledge of the sea.96 Of the three crewmembers on a typical pirate skiff, at least one 
would be a fisherman.  Some interviews with pirate groups suggest that ex-fishermen 
carried out attacks exclusively, with other activities being carried out by non-fishermen 
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pirates.97  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the promise of reward lured new recruits 
from various occupations in 2005, but especially from the battered fishing industry.  
Estimates place the number of pirates at 1000 in early 2005, with up to 2500 more in the 
training pipeline, the majority of whom were either ex-fishermen or former Somali 
Navy.98  Having heard of the massive ransoms being brought in by pirates, when 
fisherman Farah Ismail Eid found himself no longer able to provide for his wife and two 
children in 2005, he traded what fishing equipment he had left for AK-47s and RPGs.99 
Other pirates claim they also switched from fishing to piracy in 2005 because of the 
better opportunity it afforded them when they could no longer subsist on fishing due to a 
decline in catch.100  
Containers of hazardous waste—uranium, nuclear material, heavy metals such as 
mercury and cadmium, along with lead—broke open when they were washed ashore by 
the tsunami, spilling their contents into the waters and onto the beaches.101  UN studies 
ultimately suggested that the amount of hazardous waste spilled was relatively low,102 
but dumping of hazardous waste nevertheless became a new rallying call for pirates, who 
now claimed they were carrying out their activities to fight illegal fishing and hazardous 
waste dumping.103  This justification allowed fishermen and others to deny that they were 
criminals—even Time magazine discussed the problem of toxic waste, agreeing that 
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something should be done to stop the dumping.104  It is difficult to ascertain whether or 
not this had a direct impact on the level of piracy, though anecdotal evidence from pirates 
shows that this often-cited reason for piracy may have in fact added to the draw toward 
piracy for some, and legitimized the activity for others.105   
Finally, the tsunami exacerbated the ongoing food shortage, leading to an increase 
in World Food Program (WFP) aid shipments, 80–90% of which were delivered by cargo 
ship.106  These vessels increased the overall level of shipping traffic in the region and 
bore higher than average risk of pirate attack as they sailed close to the coast approaching 
ports.  The M/V Semlow was hijacked in June 2005 and the M/V Miltow in October 
2005.107  These WFP hijackings were part of two surges in successful hijackings overall, 
in June and November.108  IMB and foreign policy think tanks estimate that until 2008 
the average ransom per vessel was $1M.109  In total, 22 vessels were captured and held 
for ransom in 2005, increasing the income of the pirates and allowing them to expand 
their enterprises further (Table 2).110 
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Table 2.   Estimated ransom amounts per year.111 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Ransom  $3M $22M $6M $12M $100M 
 
By 2005, shipping companies were already avoiding the Somali coast due to the 
increasing violence at sea.  The WFP shipped 32,000 tons/month of food aid into Somalia 
in 2005, which brought 80–100 additional, slow moving vessels/year, through 2008, 
along the coastline of Somalia.112  This created a target rich environment, increasing the 
success rate of pirate attacks (Figure 3).113 The success rate jumped from about 25% in 
2004 to 50% in 2005, before dropping off in 2006.  This in turn led to larger amounts of 
money being taken in by individual pirates, and an increased supply of them.  
 
Figure 3.   Number of successful and failed attacks, 2004–2008.114  
                                                 
111 Data gathered from open source search of piracy attacks and reported ransoms paid. Strategy Page, 
Sea Transportation Article Index, http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htseamo/default.aspx (accessed 
August 10, 2010);  International Chamber of Commerce, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, http://www.icc-
ccs.org/ (accessed August 10, 2010). 
112  World Food Program, Shipping, 2010, http://logistics.wfp.org/logistic-services/shipping (accessed 
August 10, 2010). 
113  Donna Nincic, “Maritime Piracy in Africa”: 11. 
114 Adapted from IMO circular data (http://www.imo.org/circulars) 
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B. BUSINESS MODEL 
Reinvestment of profits from piracy attacks in 2005 and later went to import new 
outboard motors and boats, further increasing the size and effectiveness of the 
operations.115  Outboard motors allowed pirates to catch up to vessels during an attack.  
Somali fishermen generally operate with 15–30 horsepower motors.116  Pirate skiffs 
required engines with 60–100 horsepower to catch a commercial fishing or merchant 
vessel.117  Pirate leader Farah Ismail Eid reports that after several failed attacks with 
three boats he was responsible for he purchased more powerful engines from Dubai, with 
which he had more success.118  
However, there was a sharp reduction in piracy in 2006 (to 10 attacks) as a result 
of the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which established control over most of 
Somalia in June 2006, cracking down on piracy and forcing warlords and their militia to 
disband.119  With return of the rule of law on land, including amputation as a punishment 
for theft (including piracy), pirated vessels could not be brought near shore and supplied, 
and hostages could not be held onshore.120  Despite the sophistication of the business 
model, the imposition of rule of law, even by the very weak short-lived state the ICU 
created, stopped it cold.  Fortunately, for the pirates, the rule of law collapsed when the 
Ethiopian army displaced the ICU in early 2007, and they went right back to business.  
                                                 
115  Sara Percy and Anja Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia, Discussion Paper, DIW Berlin 
(Berlin: DIW, 2010), 25. 
116  Daahir Burale, FAO Post Tsunami Assessment, 16; G.H. Musse, “Current Status of Marine 
Fisheries in Somalia,” in Assessment & Monitoring of Marine Systems, 255–265 (Kuala Terengganu: 
University Putra Malaysia Terengganu, 1999); Gonzalo Tello, Fisheries Tsunami Emergency Program, 
EOM Report, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations (Nairobi: FAO, 2005), 30. 
117  International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali Coast, 
Recommendations (Nairobi: United Nations, 2009), 18; Robert Middleton, Piracy In Somalia, Briefing, 
Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), 7. Sara Percy 
and Anja Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia, 25. 
118  Shashank Bengali, “An Interview with a Jailed Somali Pirate Leader”: 7. 
119  International Maritime Organization, “IMO Assembly calls for action on piracy off Somalia,” 
Newsroom, November 24, 2005; International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery at Sea, Annual, (London: IMO, 2007), Annex 4, 2; Patrick Lennox, “Contemporary Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (Calgary, 2008), 4. Data on piracy 
do not differentiate between Somalia and Puntland (which the ICU did not control) in 2006.   
120  Sara Percy and Anja Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia; Sarah Percy and Anja 
Shortland, The Pirates of Somalia, 4; Ibid, 12–13. 
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Between April 2007 and the end of 2008 there were 111 attacks (Figure 3).  New, smaller 
pirate organizations, born from legitimate fishing businesses, emerged around 2008, 
suggesting that piracy was now more profitable at the enterprise level than fishing.121 
Pirates had a banner year in 2008, reportedly taking in $100M in ransom. 
In November 2005, the IMO had established a 200-nautical-mile avoidance range, 
which might have had some effect on the level of piracy after the fall of the ICU but for 
new developments in the business model.  By 2006, attacks were carried out using radio 
and satellite phone communication, launched from mother ships with enough weapons, 
fuel, and water for several months of activity at sea.122  Handheld GPS and portable 
satellite phones enabled pirates to coordinate attacks with mother ships operating at great 
distances, acting like wolf packs.123   Automated Identification System (AIS) technology 
was adopted to aid the search for targets, allowing pirates to move beyond simply lying in 
wait.  By the end of 2005, most commercial vessels were required to carry AIS, which 
transmitted the vessel’s position, course, and speed via VHF signal to any AIS receiver 
12 to 70 miles away.124  With AIS receivers, which became cheaper and smaller in 2005, 
pirates were able to hone in on targets and conduct attacks farther out at sea.  Instead of 
having to lie in wait, hoping for a vessel to come by, pirates were now able to home in on 
specific vessels from great distances.  Even naval escorts were unable to deter all pirate 
attacks.  Naval escorts for WFP shipments started at the end of 2007, after three WFP aid 





                                                 
121  Stig Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, 34. 
122  Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland, The Pirates of Somalia, Working Paper 09-42, Department of 
Economics and Finance, Brunel University West London (London: Brunel, 2009), 4. 
123  Michael Ryan, “The Origins and Challenges of Somali Piracy,” Thesis, Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (2010), 8–10. 
124  U.S. Coast Guard, AIS Carriage Requirements, 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISCarriageReqmts (accessed July 11, 2010). 
125 U.S. Coast Guard, AIS Carriage Requirements, 2010. 
 27
were attacked at sea in 2008 and three in 2009, including the Maersk Alabama, attacked 
240 miles from the Somali coast.126  Other high-profile hijackings far out at sea include 
the M/V Faina, carrying Russian T-72 tanks, captured 300 miles from the Somali coast 
and the M/V Sirius Star, a 900-foot long very large crude carrier, captured 400 miles from 
Somalia.127  
The convergence of the evolving business of piracy and the December 2004 
tsunami led to a dramatic increase in not only the incidence of piracy, but also the 
success.  Fishermen were largely put out of business by having three-quarters of their 
gear destroyed in the tsunami, causing them to search for new avenues of income. This 
loss of economic opportunity led many ex-fishermen to join pirate gangs, or support 
piracy indirectly via their knowledge of the sea.  The destruction brought by the tsunami 
also brought many WFP ships close to the shores of Somalia, when so many other ships 
tried to stay away.  An additional 80 to 100 vessels in a constrained space allowed for 
more targets.  Without the tsunami, it is likely that the business model of piracy would 
have continued to increase, and successes would have been seen in 2005–2008, but it is 
hard to discount contributions like the 2500 ex-fishermen reported to have joined the 
pirate gangs in 2005, due to a lack of fishing driving them away from their traditional 
jobs.  Perhaps they would have eventually shifted to piracy, as some lobster fishermen 
did in 2008, but in 2005 there would have been no other visible reason to push large 
amounts of fishermen into piracy.  Piracy increased in 2005 in large part because of the 
increase in targets and the increase in ex-fishermen pirates.  These factors interacted with 
the continuation of the pirate business model and the later transformation of piracy to 
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ICC, 2009), 7–15. 
127  Ibid. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
What accounts for the low level of piracy in the first 15 years of state collapse, and 
its rapid rise thereafter?  As this thesis has shown, a transformation of the pirate business 
model from fishermen, who started to defend their territorial waters themselves, to the 
organized crime that displaced them 15 years later, occurred in 2004 due to the 
opportunistic behavior of warlords who had the proper financing and ability to 
operationalize the fledgling pirate gangs.  This did not happen in 1994, because piracy was 
still in its infancy stages, with attacks being carried out by loose groups of disgruntled 
fishermen.  The tsunami that occurred in December 2004 helped to fuel the trend of 
increasing success that was created by the warlords moving into piracy in 2003–2004.  This 
is important in resolving the debate between those who claim the impoverished fishermen 
should be the target population for combating piracy and those who argue that the 
fishermen have nothing to do with piracy and therefore should not be taken into account.  
The shift of piracy from loosely organized groups of ex-fishermen to more 
organized pirate gangs was driven by a shift in motives, as piracy began to be strictly 
about money.  Warlords in Somalia were too busy with other moneymaking schemes, 
such as the banana trade and profiting from fishing licenses, to be concerned with moving 
into the market until 2002–2003, when those sources of profit dried up.  The shift in 1996 
to holding merchant ships ransom was pivotal in bringing piracy to the attention of 
warlords such as Afweyne.  The shift of piracy toward more organized groups also gave 
warlords a loosely formed organization to co-opt; versus the unstructured robbery-at-sea 
that took place in the early to mid 1990s.  That condition, coupled with the increasing 
success of pirates in extracting ransoms when the shift in targets held from ransom from 
fishing vessels to merchant vessels led warlord Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” to 
move into the business of piracy.  Afweyne provided a business expertise that included 
the acquisition of better equipment, faster motors, and better-trained pirates from 
Puntland, which flourished in the stateless environment of Somalia.  Other powerful 
warlords and strongmen of Somalia because of its demonstrated success emulated the 
Afweyne model.  The warlords and their financiers, who were businessmen, became a 
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driver of the increase in piracy around 2005, which is often overlooked because the 
temporary suppression by the ICU, and the delay associated with bringing new 
equipment and technology online, meant that piracy did not really take off until 2008.  
Focusing on the 2008 increase in pirate attacks misses the how and why of the transition.  
This understanding of how the transition occurred is important for understanding how to 
disrupt piracy and pirate networks.  Understanding why and how it shifted to a model 
more like organized crime impacts the tactics that should be employed to work against 
piracy.  Fishery regulations and enforcement along will no longer work as a method to 
combat piracy, because of its criminal nature.  Simple steps such as safeguarding vessel 
cargo manifests and transit routes can be effective in the fight against piracy.     
However, the December 2004 tsunami also played a critical role in the emergence 
of this piracy as a (criminal) business enterprise.  The evidence shows that the tsunami 
had short-term effects in 2005 that were enough to provide a critical boost to the evolving 
business of piracy.  By providing a larger pool of knowledgeable seamen to carry out 
attacks on ships and bringing WFP ships close to the Somali coast, the tsunami led to 
more success in 2005 than ever seen before.  Capturing larger merchant vessels with 
expensive cargoes led to increased ransom payments, which further bolstered the ability 
of pirates to reach far out to sea in numerous locations by purchasing better equipment.  
The overall effect of this was to draw more financing and more pirates.  Without the 2005 
spike, and especially the high success rate that was never repeated, the post-Afweyne 
investors may not have seen the business as profitable, and not invested as heavily in it as 
has been experienced in the past several years.  Thus, the virtual collapse of Somali 
fishing accelerated the already increasing dominance of piracy in the waters off Somalia.  
While the business model of piracy had already crafted the requisite model for training 
and structure, it lacked the support from the populace and lacked the enabling 
environment to flourish.  The conditions created following the tsunami enabled both to 
exist, which supported the rise of piracy.  Absent a tsunami, there would have still been a 
rise in piracy, though most likely not as steep an incline as there was from 2004–2005.  
Among the factors that pushed piracy in Somalia was the plight of the fishermen.  This 
was temporary, but nevertheless it changed everything about piracy.  While there may be 
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some residual effect of piracy in providing a more plentiful fishery, the belief that 
fishermen themselves can improve the conditions may help to both put negative pressure 
on the pirates and stem the flow of fishermen transferring into the pirate trade.  
Improving processing techniques and access to markets will benefit the local economies.  
Regenerating the fishing co-operatives that existed prior to the civil war, along with 
better access to markets, will reduce overheads and increase earnings.  The UN 
consultants that investigated the communities following the tsunami also believed that 
there was greater potential for fish products in the domestic markets.128  International 
NGOs must play a role in the redevelopment of the coastal villages in Somalia, due to the 
extreme distrust that exists between local NGOs and clan leaders along the coast. 
Local initiatives carried out properly can lead to an improved employment 
environment for young Somali men from coastal towns.  Somalia’s unemployment rate 
tops 50%, which includes two-thirds of all young males.  While a job that pays a self-
sufficient wage will certainly not compete monetarily with the profits that drew young 
males to piracy in 2005, it has the prospects of being more stable, and therefore more 
promising in the long term.  In conjunction with law enforcement and an international 
naval presence designed to make the costs of piracy outweigh the benefits, a step toward 
a reduction in piracy can be made.  Strengthening local institutions and markets can help 
to stabilize the coastal economy in Somalia, which will provide jobs for young Somalis.   
When looking for a solution to piracy off Somalia, it must be remembered that 
piracy emerged out of massive exploitation of the fisheries by foreign IUU fishing 
vessels, which created economic hardships among the fishing communities.  Local 
fishermen on the grounds of IUU fishing and the dumping of toxic waste legitimized 
piracy.  The potential exists to combat piracy through undercutting that legitimization by 
eliminating IUU fishing and the dumping of toxic waste.  This, however, assumes that the 
ideological legitimization is more important than the cash being distributed to the people 
in the fishing communities.  Therefore, joining this de-legitimization with strong 
enforcement at sea may impact the drive toward piracy.       
                                                 
128  Daahir Burale, FAO Post Tsunami Assessment Mission to Central and South Coast of Somalia, 
Field Report, United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (UN, 2005), 23. 
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Among the factors that facilitate piracy in Somalia, the most significant one is the 
lack of a functioning state ashore.  It is, however, unrealistic to believe that the 
international community has either the political capital or the financial capital to rebuild 
the Somali state.  A top-down approach would be costly and require much more time than 
the international community is willing to spend.  A much more realistic method would be 
a combination of the top-down and bottom-up stabilization methods.  A “building block” 
approach, wherein several microstates are created with the end goal of unification, has 
promise.  The weak state that the ICU created was able to enforce laws against piracy and 
successfully joined that enforcement with military attacks against pirate strongholds 
along the coast.  The dramatic decline in piracy in Somalia during the reign of the ICU 
shows promise for a shore-based method of stopping piracy, though it would be more 
difficult today, with current Islamic radicals in the pirate strongholds supporting rather 
than suppressing piracy.  While it is accepted that piracy is far from being an enterprise 
undertaken solely by fishermen, it was interesting to note that during the rule of the ICU, 
coinciding with the decline in piracy, fishing productivity in Somalia increased.  More 
research would be needed to determine whether fishing picked up due to a reduction in 
piracy, or if the ICU and the UN projects to rebuild the fishery worked in tandem to drive 
low-level pirates from piracy back to fishing.   
By both providing hope for employment and an effective deterrent from piracy, 
the ever-increasing trend in piracy can be reduced.  Targeting the population of fishermen 
can work to reduce the pool of available skilled mariners to the pirate leaders.  The early 
stages of piracy, carried out by fishermen, did not include ransoms and did not include 
capturing merchant vessels.  It is plausible that the early generation of pirates was more 
interested in protecting the fishing grounds and making a living as they knew how.  The 
2004–2005 shifts of fishermen into piracy appear to have been affected by the ability of 
fishermen to earn a living wage for themselves and their families.  Those who were 
driven by a desire to earn vast riches by piracy can be dissuaded from such activity by 
making it extremely prohibitive and dangerous.  This thesis has shown that both avenues 
of approach are needed to combat piracy. 
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